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Abstract
In this paper, which is the third installment of the author’s trilogy on mar-
gin loan pricing, we analyze 1, 367 monthly observations of the U.S. broker call
money rate, which is the interest rate at which stock brokers can borrow to
fund their margin loans to retail clients. We describe the basic features and
mean-reverting behavior of this series and juxtapose the empirically-derived
laws of motion with the author’s prior theories of margin loan pricing (Gari-
valtis 2019a-b). This allows us to derive stochastic differential equations that
govern the evolution of the margin loan interest rate and the leverage ratios
of sophisticated brokerage clients (namely, continuous time Kelly gamblers).
Finally, we apply Merton’s (1974) arbitrage theory of corporate liability pric-
ing to study theoretical constraints on the risk premia that could be generated
in the market for call money. Apparently, if there is no arbitrage in the U.S.
financial markets, the implication is that the total volume of call loans must
constitute north of 70% of the value of all leveraged portfolios.
Keywords: Broker Call Rate, Call Money Rate, Margin Loans, Net Inter-
est Margin, Risk Premium, Mean-Reverting Processes, Vasicek Model, Kelly
Criterion, Monopoly Pricing, Arbitrage Pricing
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d(Call Ratet) = −0.516(Call Ratet − 3.943) dt+ 2.99 dWt (1)
=⇒ d(Margin Ratet) = −0.516(Margin Ratet − 5.909) dt+ 1.495 dWt. (2)
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“Since those who rule in the city do so
because they own a lot, I suppose they’re
unwilling to enact laws to prevent young
people who’ve had no discipline from
spending and wasting their wealth, so that
by making loans to them, secured by the
young people’s property, and then calling
those loans in, they themselves become even
richer and more honored.”
—Plato, The Republic, 380 B.C.
“Neither a borrower nor a lender be:
For loan oft loses both itself and friend.”
—Hamlet
“Creditors have better memories than
debtors; and creditors are a superstitious
sect, great observers of set days and times.”
—Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard’s
Almanack, 1758
“Debt is the prolific mother of folly and
crime.”
—Benjamin Disraeli
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1 Introduction
This paper is inspired chiefly by two of the author’s theoretical formulas for margin
loan pricing by stock brokers (Garivaltis 2019a-b):
1. The instantaneous monopoly price of margin loans to Kelly (1956)
gamblers:
r∗L =
1
2
rB +
1
2
(ν − σ2/2) (3)
2. The negotiated interest rate under instantaneous Nash (1950)
Bargaining1 with Kelly gamblers:
r∗L =
3
4
rB +
1
4
(ν − σ2/2). (4)
In these formulas, r∗L denotes the (continuously-compounded) margin loan interest
rate charged by the broker over the differential time step [t, t+dt], where ν := µ−σ2/2
is the asymptotic (or logarithmic) growth rate of the stock market index, σ is the
annual volatility, and µ is the annual (arithmetic) drift rate. rB denotes the broker’s
cost of funding (“broker call money rate”) for the duration [t, t+ dt]. These formulas
are of great interest on account of their simplicity and their practicality; naturally,
the broker charges more if the underlying growth opportunity
dSt := µ dt+ σ dWt (5)
d(logSt) = (µ− σ2/2) dt+ σ dWt (6)
1This formula corresponds to one particular threat point, whereby the broker refuses to issue the
client a margin loan (or the client refuses to borrow any money). For the general Nash Bargaining
solution (relative to an arbitrary threat point), cf. with Garivaltis (2019b). If the monopoly market
structure itself is taken as the threat point, then the negotiated interest rate will of course be lower
than the monopoly price. Note that the threat of no margin loans at all is apparently so severe that
the gambler is suddenly willing to pay more than the monopoly price.
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is more favorable (higher ν, lower σ). Because all the action (the broker posts a
monopoly price, or the principals Nash bargain over both the price and quantity of
margin loans) happens over the differential time step [t, t + dt], the formulas apply
equally well to a general situation whereby the stock market index St is governed by
time- and state-dependent parameters µ(St, t) and σ(St, t). The affine relationships
(3) and (4) imply that the net interest margin r∗L − rB must shrink whenever the
broker call rate rB increases; ceteris paribus, for a 100 basis point fluctuation in the
broker call rate, only 50 bps will pass through to the consumer (or 75 bps under Nash
Bargaining).
The purpose of this article, then, is to use empirical data to divine the general
laws of motion of the U.S. broker call rate rB(t), and to study the logical consequences
for the random behavior of margin loan interest rates, risk premia, and the leverage
ratios of continuous time Kelly gamblers. The U.S. broker call money rate, which is
published daily in periodicals like The Wall Street Journal and Investor’s Business
Daily, is so-named because stock brokers must be prepared to repay these funds
immediately upon “call” from the lending institution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data set, which consists
of some 1, 367 monthly observations (covering the years 1857-1970) published by
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). We estimate the mean-reverting
(monthly) specification
Call Ratet+1 = 3.943
(0.08)
+ 0.597
(0.022)
(Call Ratet − 3.943
(0.08)
) + 2.362t, (7)
and use it to construct a classical method-of-moments estimator of the analogous
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (or Vasicek model) in continuous time. Inspired by the
fact that Bankrate.com reports only the two most recent monthly observations of
3
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the broker call rate, we develop some out-of-sample forecasts based on the empirical
AR(2) model
Call Ratet+1 = 1.215
(0.112)
+ 0.456
(0.026)
· Call Ratet + 0.235
(0.026)
· Call Ratet−1 + 2.297t. (8)
Section 3 juxtaposes the empirical specifications (7) and (8) with the theoretical
pricing formula (3) to derive stochastic differential and difference equations that must
govern the evolution of the margin loan interest rates charged by stock brokers. As
an application, we deduce and simulate the implied law of motion for the leverage
ratios of continuous time Kelly gamblers. Finally, section 4 applies Merton’s (1974)
arbitrage theory of corporate liability pricing to derive theoretical constraints on the
risk premia that could be generated in the market for call money. Based on Fortune’s
(2000) suggestion, we model a situation whereby stock brokers are not willing or able
to hedge the default risks of their margin loans; at the same time, they must pledge
their customers’ securities as collateral to the banks and financial institutions who
lend in the market for call money. This environment generates positive risk premia
because the banks are exposed to a credit event whereby the retail client defaults
on his margin loan, and the broker in turn defaults on its debt to the banks that
(partially) funded the loan. Our numerical work indicates that, in comparing the
prevailing (low) U.S. Treasury yields with the broker call rate (which is 4.25% as
of this writing), the implied loan-to-value ratios of retail borrowers are north of 70
percent. This is an absurd figure (for one thing, it contradicts U.S. Regulation-T),
and it seems to indicate that U.S. banks are earning substantial arbitrage profits on
the spread of the call rate over the risk-free rate. Section 5 concludes the paper.
4
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2 Broker Call Rate
2.1 Basic Description of the Data
We proceed to analyze T := 1, 367 monthly observations of the broker call money
rate (January 1, 1857 through November 1, 1970, annual interest rates, in percent) as
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ macrohistory database (FRED).
In order to find agreement with the author’s prior work on margin loan pricing (Gari-
valtis 2019a-b), we must deal with the continuously-compounded annual interest rate,
as follows:
yt := Continuously-Compounded Interest Ratet
= 100 · log(1 + Interest Ratet/100)
= Interest Ratet − (Interest Ratet)
2
200
+
(Interest Ratet)
3
30, 000
− · · ·
(9)
Figure 1 gives a plot of the time series (yt)
T
t=1; the grey bars on the figure indicate
NBER recessions, during which rates have usually fallen precipitously. For the sake of
smoothing out the choppy appearance of (yt)
T
t=1, Figure 2 plots the 12-month simple
moving average
yt :=
1
12
11∑
j=0
yt−j. (10)
Table 1 contains basic descriptive information about the broker call rate; in our
sample, the call money rate averaged 3.95%, with a standard deviation of 2.95% from
its long-run mean. The mean absolute deviation was 1.95%. Although at times the
broker call rate has spiked to levels as high as 47.8%, the historical 95th percentile is
a more palatable 8.16%.
5
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Figure 3 shows a histogram of the realizations (yt)
1,367
t=1 = (Call Ratet)
1,367
t=1 . On
that score, making use of Gaussian basis functions and a bandwidth of h := 0.502,
we have the estimated population density function
fˆ(y) := 0.000581
1,367∑
t=1
0.138(y−Call Ratet)
2
, (11)
which is plotted in Figure 4. To help visualize the internal correlation structure of
the call money rate, Figure 5 gives a plot of the sample autocorrelation function
ρˆj := 0.0000843
1,367∑
t=j+1
(yt − 3.95)(yt−j − 3.95), (12)
where j ∈ {0, ..., 12} denotes the number of lags, in months. The sample correlation
coefficient for successive monthly observations is ρˆ1 = 59.7%. In order to control for
any confounding effects that the interim observations (yt−j+1, yt−j+2, ..., yt−1) could
possibly have on the observed relationship between yt−j and yt, Figure 6 supplements
the sample correlogram with a 24-month plot of the sample partial autocorrelation
function. As illustrated by the figure, the partial autocorrelations start to lose their
statistical significance for lags in excess of 12 months.
2.2 Reversion to the Mean
Drawing some inspiration from the sample autocorrelation function as depicted in
Figure 5, we proceed to estimate a stationary first-order autoregressive model of
(yt)
T
t=1. This amounts to the linear stochastic difference equation
Call Ratet+1 = α + ρ · Call Ratet + σt, (13)
6
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Figure 1: Monthly observations of the U.S. broker call money rate
(continuously-compounded, in percent) from January 1, 1857 through
November 1, 1970. The grey bars indicate NBER recessions.
or equivalently,
(1− ρL)yt+1 = α + σt, (14)
where L denotes the lag operator. The deep parameters are α, ρ, and σ, and the
stochastic shocks (t)
T
t=1 are assumed to be unit white noise, e.g. they are serially
uncorrelated, E[t] ≡ 0, and Var[t] ≡ 1. The contemporaneous disturbance t is
assumed to be uncorrelated with Call Ratet.
Under this terminology, the long-run mean of the (continuously-compounded)
interest rate is given by
µ := E[Call Ratet] =
α
1− ρ, (15)
7
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Figure 2: 12-month simple moving average of the broker call rate (in
percent). The grey bars indicate NBER recessions.
and the stationary variance and standard deviation are equal to
v := Var[Call Ratet] =
σ2
1− ρ2 (16)
and
s := Std(Call Ratet) =
√
v =
σ√
1− ρ2 . (17)
Of course, the (aptly named) parameter ρ in this AR(1) model is equal to the Pearson
correlation coefficient of successive monthly interest rates:
ρ = Corr(Call Ratet,Call Ratet−1). (18)
More generally (cf. Fuller 1976), the population autocorrelation function of the pro-
8
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Basic Quantitative Description
of the Broker Call Money Rate
(1857:01-1970:11)
Sample Statistic Value
Observation frequency Monthly
Number of observations (T ) 1,367
Average 3.95%
Minimum 0.25%
Maximum 47.77%
Standard deviation 2.95%
Mean absolute deviation 1.95%
5th percentile 1%
50th percentile (median) 3.69%
95th percentile 8.16%
Table 1: Summary statistics for monthly observations of the U.S. broker
call money rate.
cess (yt)
∞
t=1 is given by
Corr(Call Ratet,Call Ratet−j) = ρj. (19)
If we let θ := 1− ρ and re-arrange the empirical specification (13), we obtain the
following equivalent representations:
Call Ratet+1 − µ = ρ(Call Ratet − µ) + σt, (20)
Call Ratet+1 − Call Ratet = ∆(Call Ratet) = −θ(Call Ratet − µ) + σt, (21)
where θ represents the rate of monthly mean reversion per 100 basis points of devia-
tion from the equilibrium level. The coefficients α, ρ can be recovered from the new
parameters µ, θ via the relations α = θµ and ρ = 1− θ.
Table 2 gives the parameter estimates that obtain when fitting the empirical rela-
9
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Figure 3: Histogram for the U.S. broker call rate (continuously-
compounded, in percent). Bin width = 25 basis points; values > 10%
are not pictured.
tionship yt+1 = α+ ρyt + σt via ordinary least squares (OLS). The linear regression
is illustrated in Figure 7, which plots the broker call rate versus its lagged values.
Thus, our empirical law of motion for the call money rate is
Call Ratet+1 = 3.943
(0.08)
+ 0.597
(0.022)
(Call Ratet − 3.943
(0.08)
) + 2.362t, (22)
∆(Call Ratet) = −0.403
(0.022)
(Call Ratet − 3.943
(0.08)
) + 2.362t. (23)
This means that for every 100 basis points of deviation from its long-run average of
3.94%, the broker call rate is expected to close the gap at a rate of 40 basis points per
month. However, this mean-reverting behavior is corrupted by random disturbances
whose average (root-mean-squared) magnitude is 2.36% per month.
10
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Figure 4: Estimated population density fˆ(y) for the U.S. broker call
rate (Gaussian kernel, bandwidth = 0.502).
Solving the first-order difference equation (13) for Call Ratet in terms of Call Rate0,
one gets the expression (cf. Hamilton 1994)
Call Ratet =
1
1− ρL(α + σt−1)
= µ+ ρt(Call Rate0 − µ) + σ
t−1∑
s=0
ρt−1−ss
= 3.943
(0.08)
+ 0.597
(0.022)
t(Call Rate0 − 3.943
(0.08)
) + 2.362
t−1∑
s=0
0.597
(0.022)
t−1−ss.
(24)
Thus, our general forecast for the broker call rate t months hence (normalizing today’s
11
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Figure 5: 12-month sample correlogram for the U.S. broker call rate.
date to 0) is
E[Call Ratet|Call Rate0] = 3.943
(0.08)
+ 0.597
(0.022)
t(Call Rate0 − 3.943
(0.08)
) . (25)
The corresponding root-mean-squared forecast error is
Std(Call Ratet|Call Rate0) = σ√
1− ρ2
√
1− ρ2t = s
√
1− ρ2t
= 2.944
√
1− 0.356t.
(26)
Figure 8 plots the root-mean-squared forecast error against time for t ∈ {0, ..., 6}.
Example 1 (Out-of-Sample Predictions). As of this writing, Bankrate.com reports
the following information about the U.S. call money rate:
12
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Figure 6: 24-month plot of the sample partial autocorrelation function
of the U.S. broker call rate.
• One year ago, the broker call rate was y0 := 3.5%, (y0 − µ = −0.443).
• One month ago, the broker call rate was y11 = 4.25%, (y11 − µ = 0.307).
• The current U.S. call money rate (as of this writing) is also y12 = 4.25%.
Thus, from the standpoint of a month ago, today’s call money rate would have been
forecasted to be 4.13%, for a prediction error of 0.12%. From the standpoint of a year
ago, today’s call money rate would have been forecasted to be 3.94%, for a prediction
error of 0.31%. These errors compare favorably with the root-mean-squared errors
plotted in Figure 8.
2.3 AR(2) Model
Taking our cue from the fact that Bankrate.com only reports the two most recent
monthly observations of the broker call rate, we proceed to estimate a (stationary)
13
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OLS Estimates for the
Mean-Reverting Specification
(R2 = 36%; standard errors in parentheses)
Parameter/Regression Statistic Estimate/Value Conf. Interval
α (Intercept) 1.587*** (0.107) [1.377,1.797]
ρ (Correlation of successive observations) 0.597*** (0.022) [0.555,0.64]
1/ρ (Root of 1− ρL) 1.674
θ = 1− ρ (Monthly rate of mean-reversion) 0.403
µ = α/θ (Long-run mean) 3.943
σ (Root-mean-squared prediction error) 2.362
s := σ/
√
1− ρ2 (Long-run standard deviation) 2.944
Mean absolute residual 1.124
5th percentile absolute residual 0.0958
50th percentile (median) absolute residual 0.853
95th percentile absolute residual 2.787
Table 2: Parameter estimates for mean-reverting model of the U.S.
broker call money rate.
second-order autoregressive model for the sake of lowering our root-mean-squared
prediction error. Thus, we have the empirical specification
yt+1 = c+ φ1yt + φ2yt−1 + σt, (27)
or equivalently,
(1− φ1L− φ2L2)yt+1 = c+ σt. (28)
The long-run mean is
µ := E[yt] =
c
1− φ1 − φ2 , (29)
and the unconditional variance (cf. Fuller 1976) is
v := Var[yt] =
(1− φ2)σ2
(1 + φ2)[(1− φ2)2 − φ21]
. (30)
14
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Figure 7: Scatter plot of the monthly broker call rate versus its
lagged values. The least squares line is yˆt+1 = 1.587 + 0.597yt.
When expressed in mean-deviation form, our empirical specification amounts to
yt+1 − µ = φ1(yt − µ) + φ2(yt−1 − µ) + σt, (31)
or equivalently,
∆yt := yt+1 − yt = −(1− φ1)(yt − µ) + φ2(yt−1 − µ) + σt. (32)
Table 3 summarizes the results of the autoregression. Our estimated relationship is
Call Ratet+1 = 1.215
(0.112)
+ 0.456
(0.026)
· Call Ratet + 0.235
(0.026)
· Call Ratet−1 + 2.297t . (33)
15
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Figure 8: Root-mean-squared forecast errors (in percent) for up to 6
months ahead.
For the sake of calculating the general forecast E[yt|y0, y1], we must solve the following
(deterministic) difference equation (cf. Spiegel 1971):
yt+1 = c+ φ1yt + φ2yt−2. (34)
A particular solution is of course given by ypt ≡ µ. In order to solve the associated
homogeneous equation
yt+1 = φ1yt + φ2yt−2, (35)
we require the roots of the characteristic equation
λ2 − φ1λ− φ2 = 0, (36)
16
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Figure 9: 12-month forecast for the broker call rate (starting from
y0 := 4.25% on 5/18/2019).
which are
λ1,2 =
φ1 ±
√
φ21 + 4φ2
2
= 0.764,−0.308. (37)
Thus, the general solution of the difference equation (34) is
E[yt|y0, y1] = µ+ 1
λ2 − λ1{[λ2(y0 − µ)− (y1 − µ)]λ
t
1 + [y1 − µ− λ1(y0 − µ)]λt2}
= 3.938− 0.933{[−0.308(y0 − 3.938)− (y1 − 3.938)]0.764t
+ [y1 − 3.938− 0.764(y0 − 3.938)](−0.308)t}.
(38)
Figure 10 compares the 12-month forecasts of our estimated AR(1) and AR(2) models,
given the two most recent observations y0 := 4.25 and y1 := 4.25. Note that the
17
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OLS Estimates for the
AR(2) Specification
(R2 = 39%; standard errors in parentheses)
Parameter/Regression Statistic Estimate/Value Conf. Interval
c (Intercept) 1.215*** (0.112) [0.995,1.434]
φ1 (Weight on first lagged value) 0.456*** (0.026) [0.405,0.508]
φ2 (Weight on second lagged value) 0.235*** (0.026) [0.184,0.287]
µ = c/(1− φ1 − φ2) (Long-run mean) 3.938
σ (Root-mean-squared prediction error) 2.297
s (Long-run standard deviation) 2.945
Mean absolute residual 1.046
5th percentile absolute residual 0.0778
50th percentile (median) absolute residual 0.716
95th percentile absolute residual 2.884
Roots of lag polynomial 1− φ1L− φ2L2 {1.309, -3.248}
Characteristic roots (of λ2 − φ1λ− φ2) {0.764, -0.308}
Table 3: Parameter estimates for AR(2) model of the U.S. broker call
money rate.
AR(2) forecast exhibits a significantly slower rate of mean-reversion than its AR(1)
counterpart. On that score, Figure 11 plots the two models’ responses to an exogenous
100 basis point impulse in the broker call rate. After 6 months, the persistent effect
on the broker call rate amounts to 14 basis points under the AR(2) model; at the
12-month mark, the marginal effect dissipates to just 3 basis points.
2.4 Vasicek Model
To better understand the short-term (intra-month) fluctuations of the broker call rate,
we use our monthly AR(1) parameter estimates to help fit an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
model of interest rate evolution in continuous time (cf. Mikosch 1998). Vasicek (1977)
was the first researcher who used Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes to model the mean-
reverting behavior of interest rates. In our context, we have the following stochastic
18
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Figure 10: 12-month forecast comparison for AR(1) and AR(2) models of
the broker call rate, given the two most recent observations y0 := 4.25
and y1 := 4.25 (as of 5/18/2019).
differential equation (the time t being measured in months):
d(Call Ratet) = −θ(Call Ratet − µ) dt+ σ dWt. (39)
Equivalently, we have the integrated form (cf. Mikosch 1998)
Call Ratet = Call Rate0 − θ
∫ t
0
(Call Rates − µ)ds+ σWt, (40)
where Wt is a standard Brownian motion and dWt := 
√
dt is its instantaneous change
in position over the differential time step [t, t+dt]. The parameter µ := E[Call Ratet]
represents the stationary mean, or long-run equilibrium level, of the broker call money
19
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Figure 11: Comparison of model responses to an exogenous 100 basis
point impulse in the broker call rate.
rate. The parameter
− θ := E[d(Call Ratet)|Call Ratet]
Call Ratet − µ
/
dt (41)
denotes the instantaneous rate of mean-reversion, e.g. the expected rate of change in
the interest rate as a percentage of its current deviation from the long-run average.
Finally, the parameter
σ2 :=
Var[d(Call Ratet)|Call Ratet]
dt
(42)
represents the local variance of interest rate changes per unit time.
The solution of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck equation (cf. Mikosch 1998) is
Call Ratet = µ+ e
−θt(Call Rate0 − µ) + σ
∫ t
0
e−θ(t−s)dWs, (43)
20
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and the stationary (long-term) standard deviation is
Std(Call Ratet) =
σ√
2θ
. (44)
The corresponding t-month ahead forecast is
E[Call Ratet|Call Rate0] = µ+ e−θt(Call Rate0 − µ), (45)
and the root-mean-squared forecast error is
Std(Call Ratet|Call Rate0) = σ√
2θ
√
1− e−2θt. (46)
In order to reconcile the conditional forecast function (45) with the AR(1) forecast
E[Call Ratet|Call Rate0] = µ+ ρt(Call Rate0 − µ), we must have
µ := µ = 3.943 and (47)
θ := − log ρ = 0.516. (48)
In order to reconcile the long-run standard deviation (44) with its AR(1) counterpart
s = σ/
√
1− ρ2, we must have
σ := s
√
−2 log ρ = σ
√
−2 log ρ
1− ρ2 = 2.99. (49)
Thus, the following three equations summarize our estimated law of (continuous)
motion for the U.S. broker call rate.
21
The Laws of Motion of the Broker Call Rate in the United States A. Garivaltis
Figure 12: Intra-month simulation of the (continuously-compounded)
U.S. broker call rate (y0 := 4.25).
Differential Form:
d(Call Ratet) = −0.516(Call Ratet − 3.943) dt+ 2.99 dWt, (50)
Integral Form:
Call Ratet = Call Rate0 − 0.516
∫ t
0
(Call Rates − 3.943)ds+ 2.99Wt, (51)
Explicit Form:
Call Ratet = 3.943 + 0.597
t(Call Rate0 − 3.943) + 2.99
∫ t
0
0.597t−sdWs. (52)
Figure 12 plots the result of an intra-month simulation of the U.S. broker call rate,
starting from an initial level of y0 := 4.25.
22
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3 Implications for Margin Loan Pricing
For the sake of this section, so as to avoid any confusion, all interest rates, stan-
dard deviations, drifts, etc. will now be reported as numbers belonging
to the unit interval [0, 1] (rather than as percentages between 0 and 100).
In the author’s prior work on margin loan pricing in continuous time (Garivaltis
2019a-b), he derived the simple theoretical relationship
Margin Loan Interest Ratet =
Broker Call Ratet
2
+ C, (53)
where C is a constant that is independent of the broker call rate and independent of
the time t. This was done by assuming that the broker’s sole (representative) client is
a continuous time Kelly gambler (cf. Luenberger 1998) who borrows cash over each
differential time step [t, t+ dt] for the sake of leveraged betting on a single risk asset
(say, the market index) whose price St follows the geometric Brownian motion
dSt := St(µS dt+ σS dW
S
t ), (54)
d(logSt) = (µS − σ2S/2) dt+ σS dWt. (55)
Here, we have used the symbol dW S(t) to denote the standard Brownian motion
that drives the asset price; the drift and volatility are µS and σS, respectively. The
corresponding Kelly bet (cf. Thorp 2006) for this market over the interval [t, t + dt]
amounts to the client betting the fraction
b(rL) :=
µS − rL
σ2S
(56)
of his wealth on the stock, where rL denotes the continuously-compounded interest
23
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rate charged by the broker for the duration [t, t+dt]. Thus, the instantaneous quantity
of margin loans demanded per dollar of client equity (e.g. the instantaneous demand
curve) is given by the formula
q(rL) := b(rL)− 1 =
(
µS
σ2S
− 1
)
− 1
σ2S
rL. (57)
Equivalently, the broker faces the inverse (instantaneous) demand curve
rL = (µS − σ2S)− σ2Sq (58)
for the duration [t, t + dt]. On account of the fact that the broker has constant
marginal cost (viz. the broker call rate), the corresponding monopoly midpoint price
is
Margin Ratet =
Marginal Costt + Choke Price
2
=
Call Ratet
2
+
µS − σ2S
2
=
Call Ratet
2
+
1
2
(νS − σ2S/2),
(59)
where the parameter νS := µS−σ2S/2 represents the expected compound (logarithmic)
growth rate of the market index (say, the S&P 500). Thus, our constant C is given
by
C :=
νS
2
− σ
2
S
4
. (60)
Given the backdrop of our mean-reverting empirical model of the broker call rate, The
theoretical pricing formula (53) implies that the margin loan interest rates charged
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by brokers must also follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. For, we have
d(Margin Ratet) =
d(Call Ratet)
2
= −θ
2
(Call Ratet − µ) dt+ σ
2
dWt. (61)
Bearing in mind that Call Ratet = 2(Margin Ratet − C), we get the law of motion
d(Margin Ratet) = −θ(Margin Ratet − µ/2− C) dt+
σ
2
dWt. (62)
Thus, we conclude that the long-run average of the margin loan interest rate charged
by stock brokers should be µ/2 + C, and that margin loan prices should exhibit the
same level of mean reversion (θ) as the broker’s cost of funding. However, the random
fluctuations in the margin loan interest rate should have half the magnitude of the
corresponding movements in the broker call rate.
Following Garivaltis (2019b), if we use the stylized parameters νS := 0.09, σS :=
0.15, and µS := νS + σ
2
S/2 to represent the (annual) dynamics of the S&P 500 index,
then we get C = 0.03938. Thus, our hybrid empirical/theoretical model of the margin
loan interest rate is
d(Margin Ratet) = −0.516(Margin Ratet − 0.05909) dt+ 0.01495 dWt. (63)
On account of the linear relationship b = (µS − rL)/σ2S between the margin loan
interest rate and the bet size b, it follows that the client’s quantity q = b − 1 of
margin loans per dollar of equity must also follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. A
straightforward calculation shows that
dbt = dqt = −θ
(
qt − µS − µ
2σ2S
)
dt− σ
2σ2S
dWt, (64)
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where the time t is measured in months and Wt is the standard Brownian motion
that drives the broker call rate. Thus, the leverage ratio of the (representative) Kelly
gambler reverts to its long-term mean of (µS − µ)/(2σ2S) at the same rate θ as the
broker call rate and the margin loan interest rate. Given our empirical findings, we
have the concrete (monthly) law of motion:
dbt = −0.516(bt − 2.0338) dt− 0.6644 dWt. (65)
Thus, the long-term average leverage ratio of continuous time Kelly gamblers is b :=
2.0338, for an average quantity of q := $1.0338 borrowed per dollar of client equity.
The (stationary) standard deviation of the clients’ leverage ratios is
Std(bt) =
σ
2σ2S
√
2θ
= 0.654. (66)
Figure (13) plots a 12-month simulation of the leverage ratios of Kelly gamblers,
assuming an initial value of b0 := 2.
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Figure 13: 12-month simulation of Kelly gamblers’ leverage ratios (b0 :=
2).
“A fuller account would address the pledging
of customers’ securities by broker-dealers to
obtain loans from financial institutions.”
— Peter Fortune (2000), in the New
England Economic Review
4 Arbitrage Pricing of Call Loans
In this section, we use Merton’s (1974, 1992) no-arbitrage approach to corporate
liability pricing to derive theoretical formulas for the broker call rate and the net
interest margin that banks should earn on such loans. On that score, we let r denote
the risk-free rate of interest, and we let R denote the broker call rate, where ρ :=
R − r > 0 is the corresponding risk premium. The broker himself charges his retail
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customers a margin loan interest rate of R > R. We assume that the (representative)
brokerage client borrows D dollars to finance the purchase of a single share of a
risky stock or index, whose initial price at time 0 is S0. The client’s initial equity is
E0 := S0 − D > 0. As usual, we assume that the asset price follows the geometric
Brownian motion
dSt := St(µ dt+ σ dWt), (67)
where µ is the annual drift rate, σ is the annual volatility, and Wt is a standard
Brownian motion2. Interest is assumed to compound continuously over the loan term
[0, T ], so that the client’s accumulated margin loan (debit) balance at time t is DeRt.
Thus, his equity fluctuates according to the random process Et := St −DeRt.
If the broker was willing or able to continuously monitor the client’s account for
solvency, then there would be no credit risk, for, on account of the continuous sample
path of (Et)t∈[0,T ], the broker could liquidate the account the instant that Et = 0 (or
some other threshold E). Thus, under continuous monitoring, there is certainly no
risk to the bank that funded part of the margin loan; in this case, the no-arbitrage
axiom dictates that R = r. In order to have R > r in equilibrium, we must start with
a situation whereby it is possible for the retail client to default on his margin loan.
Thus, as in Fortune (2000) and Garivaltis (2019a), we assume that the broker does
not monitor the client’s account for solvency until some given maturity date, T .
However, if the broker is willing to maintain a dynamically precise short position
in the risk asset (cf. Fortune 2000 and Garivaltis 2019a), then it is possible, in the
sense of Black and Scholes (1973), to completely “eliminate risk” through continuous
trading in the underlying. In this happenstance, the no-arbitrage principle implies a
unique margin loan interest rate R > r, but it fails to give us a characterization of
2For the purposes of this section, we are using a fresh “namespace,” whereby the symbols
µ, σ, ρ,Wt, T, etc. are divorced from what they stood for in the prequel.
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the call money rate, since there is no actual risk to the bank that funded the margin
loan. Thus, in order to generate risk premia in the call money market, we must make
the twin assumptions:
1. The broker does not check the client’s portfolio for solvency until the maturity
date, T .
2. The broker is not willing or able to hedge his own default risk.
In this environment, we now have the possibility of a “default cascade” whereby the
client defaults on his margin loan at T , and this in turn causes the broker to default on
his debt to the money market. Accordingly, we will assume that the broker borrows
d < D dollars on the money market for the sake of funding the D dollar margin loan;
the remaining D − d dollars of the margin loan constitute the broker’s own equity.
That is, we have the decomposition
Total Leveraged Portfolio Value = Client’s Equity
+ Broker’s Equity + Call Loan Balance.
(68)
Equivalently, this means that for 0 ≤ t < T , we have
Broker’s Equityt = St − Et − deRt = DeRt − deRt
= Broker’s Assetst − Broker’s Liabilitiest.
(69)
Following Fortune (2000) and Garivaltis (2019a), we assume that the retail client will
abandon his account at T if ET ≤ 0, leaving the broker with collateral worth ST .
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The propagation of margin loan
risk in Black-Scholes markets
Credit Event Upshot
ST ≥ DeRT No defaults
deRT ≤ ST < DeRT Retail client defaults but broker does not
ST < de
RT Retail client and broker both default
Table 4: The three possible credit events faced by the call lender.
Thus, the broker’s assets at the end of the loan term amount to
min(ST , De
RT ), (70)
and the broker’s final equity is equal to
min(ST , De
RT )− deRt. (71)
If the broker’s final equity is ≤ 0, then he himself will default on his debt to the
money market, leaving his creditors with collateral in the amount of min(ST , De
RT ).
Thus, the final payoff that accrues at T to the bank that made the call loan is
min{min(ST , DeRT ), deRt} = min(ST , deRt), (72)
where we have made use of the fact that d < D and R < R. Table 4 summarizes the
three possible credit events faced by the call lender.
Assuming that the bank’s call money was itself borrowed at the risk-free rate r,
the bank’s final profit (loss) is
piT := min(ST , de
RT )− derT . (73)
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Making use of the identity min(x, y) = x+ y −max(x, y), we have
piT = ST + de
RT −max(ST , deRT )− derT
= ST − derT − [max(ST , deRT )− deRT ]
= ST − derT −max(ST −K, 0),
(74)
where K := deRT . That is to say, the bank’s (random) profit piT amounts to the final
payoff of the following portfolio:
• Long one share of the stock
• Short d dollars at the risk-free rate of interest
• Short one European-style call option at a strike price of K := deRT .
Naturally, the bank can hedge its (net long) exposure to the underlying (e.g. the
bank has de facto written a covered call) by shorting a dynamically precise amount
of the retail client’s portfolio. In order to prevent riskless arbitrage opportunities,
the time-0 expected present value of the bank’s profit with respect to the equivalent
martingale measure (Q) must be zero:
0 = EQ0 [piT ] = S0 − d− BSCall(S0, 0, K, r, σ, T ). (75)
Recalling the Black and Scholes (1973) formula
BSCall(S0, 0, K, r, σ, T ) = S0N(d1)−Ke−rTN(d2), (76)
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where
d1 :=
log(S0/K) + (r + σ
2/2)T
σ
√
T
(77)
and
d2 := d1 − σ
√
T , (78)
and simplifying, we get the following equation characterizing the broker call rate:
d/S0 =
N(−d1)
1−N(d2)eρT , (79)
where ρ := R− r is the risk premium for call money,
− d1 = log(d/S0) + (ρ− σ
2/2)T
σ
√
T
, (80)
and the ratio d/S0 represents the percentage of the portfolio that has been financed
by call money. As usual, N(•) denotes the cumulative normal distribution function.
Note that the broker call rate R does not depend on the drift µ or on the margin
loan interest rate R that the broker charges its clients. The characterization (79) of
R is not particular to the numerical levels of d and S0; it only depends on their ratio
d/S0. Similarly, the numbers r and R only matter to (79) in so far as their difference
ρ := R−r is featured prominently. That is to say (cf. Merton 1974 and Merton 1992),
the risk premium for call money depends only on the following credit characteristics:
• T (the loan term);
• d/S0 (the loan-to-value ratio);
• σ (the volatility of the collateral).
The bank’s net exposure to the underlying in state (St, t) is equal to (cf. Wilmott
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Figure 14: The implied loan-to-value ratios (d/S0) and hedge ratios
(∆) for different values of the broker call rate (r := 2.088%, T :=
90/365, σ := 40%).
1998):
∆(S, t) :=
∂
∂S
[S − dert − BSCall(S, t,K, r, σ, T )] = 1−N(d1) = N(−d1). (81)
Thus, ∆ = N(−d1) represents the (dynamic) percentage of the retail client’s portfolio
that must be sold short by banks in order to hedge their counterparty risk.
Figure 14 plots the implied loan-to-value ratio d/S0 and the implied short position
∆ = N(−d1) for different values R of the broker call rate. Here, we have assumed
a risk-free rate of r := 2.088% (which is the current 5-year U.S. Treasury yield as of
this writing), a 90-day loan term (T := 90/365), and a conservative value of σ := 40%
annual stock market volatility.
Thus, we have obtained the following (“puzzling”) conclusion: even under the
conservative assumptions of a long (90-day) loan term and very high (40%) annual
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stock market volatility, the no-arbitrage axiom implies that 72.3% (!!) of the
value of all U.S. leveraged portfolios has been financed by call money.
This means that the sum total of broker and client equity must amount to only 27.7%
of the value of all leveraged portfolios. These figures contradict the well-known
legal constraint (e.g. U.S. Regulation-T) on retail margin debt:
d/S0 ≤ D/S0 ≤ 0.5︸ ︷︷ ︸
U.S. Regulation-T
. (82)
To avoid this logical contradiction, we must admit the possibility that the banks and
financial institutions that lend call money to stock brokers in the United States may
be earning substantial arbitrage profits on the spread over the risk-free rate.
Note well that varying the term of the call loan is of no great help in resolving
the puzzle; indeed, Figure 15 plots the implied maturities T that would rationalize
different values R of the broker call rate, assuming the parameters r := 2.088%, σ :=
40%, and d/S0 := 50%. For the currently observed call rate of 4.25%, we get an
implied loan term of 1.75 years and an implied delta in the amount of 6.6% of the
retail client’s portfolio.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Inspired by the author’s prior theoretical work on margin loan pricing (Garivaltis
2019a-b), this paper described and analyzed a collection of 1,367 monthly observa-
tions of the U.S. broker call money rate (1857:01 through 1970:11) supplied by the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). Our estimated AR(1) specification (and
corresponding Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model) indicates that for every 100 basis points
of deviation from its long-term average of 3.943%, the (continuously-compounded)
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Figure 15: The implied loan terms (T ) and hedge ratios (∆) for different
values of the broker call rate (r := 2.088%, σ := 40%, d/S0 := 50%).
broker call rate will revert to the mean at an expected rate of 40.3 basis points
per month, but this reversion is disturbed by monthly innovations whose root-mean-
squared magnitude is 2.362%. Buoyed by the fact that Bankrate.com reports the two
most recent observations of the broker call money rate (4.25% as of this writing), we
constructed an AR(2) model that reduced the monthly root-mean-squared prediction
error (in-sample) by 6.5 basis points, to 2.297%.
We proceeded to reconcile this empirical law of motion with following theoretical
relationship (Garivaltis 2019a), based on instantaneous monopoly pricing of margin
loans to Kelly gamblers:
Margin Loan Interest Ratet =
1
2
(Broker Call Ratet) +
1
2
(νS − σ2S/2), (83)
where νS denotes the long-run compound annual (logarithmic) growth rate of the
stock market, and σS is its annual volatility. Under this arrangement, only half of
the random movements in the broker call rate get passed on to retail consumers.
Assuming the stylized parameter values νS := 0.09 and σS := 0.15 for the S&P 500
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index, we obtained a hybrid empirical/theoretical law of motion for the margin loan
interest rate charged by stock brokers:
d(Margin Ratet) = −0.516(Margin Ratet − 5.909) + 1.495 dWt. (84)
Thus, the margin loan interest rate will display the same rate of (continuous) mean-
reversion as does the broker call rate; the unanticipated instantaneous changes in the
margin rate (= 1.495 dWt) will be half the size of the corresponding movements in
the broker call rate. We then derived a stochastic differential equation that governs
the (monthly) leverage ratios (bt) of continuous time Kelly gamblers:
dbt = −0.516(bt − 2.0338) dt− 0.6644 dWt. (85)
Hence, our empirical finding is that the long-term average interest rate on margin
loans should be 5.9%, and that the leverage ratios of sophisticated brokerage clients
should oscillate randomly about an equilibrium level of 2.03 : 1.
Finally, we used Merton’s (1974) no-arbitrage method to uniquely characterize
the correct risk premium ρ := R − r that commercial banks should earn on their
loans to stock brokers. We assumed that brokers loan money to retail clients at a
marked-up rate of R > R; to generate risk premia in the market for call money, we
had to assume that stock brokers are not willing or able to short their customers’
portfolios for the sake of hedging the default risk.
Thus, we modeled a situation whereby commercial banks are exposed to the risk
of a cascaded default, meaning that the retail client defaults on his margin loan and
the brokerage in turn defaults on its debt to the money market. The commercial
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bank can hedge this risk by shorting the dynamically precise fraction
∆t = N
(
log(d/St) + (ρ− σ2/2)(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
)
, (86)
of the retail client’s portfolio at time t, where T is the maturity date of the call loan,
ρ is the risk premium for call money, d/St is the percentage of the client’s portfolio
that is financed with call money (as opposed to broker equity and client equity), and
σ is the annual volatility of the collateral.
Under very conservative assumptions (40% annual volatility and a 90-day loan
term), we concluded that call lenders’ current level of exposure to the stock market
amounts to ∆ = 4.4% of the value of all leveraged portfolios in the United States.
Comparing the current broker call rate of 4.25% with the prevailing U.S. Treasury
yields, we found that the implied loan-to-value ratio is north of 70%. This is absurd
on account of U.S. Regulation-T, which caps the loan-to-value ratios of retail margin
borrowers at 50%. In order to alleviate this apparent contradiction, we must live with
the possibility that U.S. banks who deal in the market for call money could in fact
be earning substantial arbitrage profits on the spread of the broker call rate over the
risk-free rate.
Northern Illinois University
References
[1] Black, F. and Scholes, M., 1973. The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities. Journal of Political Economy, 81 (3), pp.637-654.
[2] Fortune, P., 2000. Margin Requirements, Margin Loans, and Margin Rates:
Practice and Principles. New England Economic Review, pp.19-44.
37
The Laws of Motion of the Broker Call Rate in the United States A. Garivaltis
[3] Fuller, W.A., 1976. Introduction to Statistical Time Series. New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
[4] Garivaltis, A., 2019a. Two Resolutions of the Margin Loan Pricing Puzzle.
Research in Economics, 73 (2), pp.199-207.
[5] Garivaltis, A., 2019b. Nash Bargaining Over Margin Loans to Kelly Gamblers.
Working Paper.
[6] Hamilton, J.D., 1994. Time Series Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
[7] Kelly, J.L., 1956. A New Interpretation of Information Rate. The Bell System
Technical Journal.
[8] Luenberger, D.G., 1998. Investment Science. New York: Oxford University
Press.
[9] Merton, R.C., 1974. On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of
Interest Rates. The Journal of Finance, 29 (2), pp.449-470.
[10] Merton, R.C., 1992. Continuous-Time Finance. Cambridge, MA: Basil Black-
well.
[11] Mikosch, T., 1998. Elementary Stochastic Calculus, With Finance in View.
River Edge, NJ: World Scientific Publishing Company.
[12] Nash, J., 1950. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18 (2), pp.155-162.
[13] Spiegel, M.R., 1971. Schaum’s Outline of Theory and Problems of Calculus
of Finite Differences and Difference Equations. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company.
38
The Laws of Motion of the Broker Call Rate in the United States A. Garivaltis
[14] Thorp, E.O., 2006. The Kelly Criterion in Blackjack, Sports Betting, and the
Stock Market. Handbook of Asset and Liability Management, Volume 1: Theory
and Methodology. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[15] Vasicek, O., 1977. An Equilibrium Characterization of the Term Structure.
Journal of Financial Economics, 5 (2), pp.177-188.
[16] Wilmott, P., 1998. Derivatives: The Theory and Practice of Financial Engi-
neering. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
39
